Feb. 13, 2009 -- When
Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal declared before a cheering crowd in Doha,
Qatar, Jan. 28, the need for a new leadership, his words
generated panic amongst leaders of the West Bank-based Palestinian
Authority as well as traditional Palestinian leadership elites
stationed in various Arab capitals.
The
reaction to Mashaal’s call was more furious than most of the statements
issued by the PA and its backers during the 23-day Israeli onslaught
against the Gaza Strip, which killed and wounded thousands of innocent
Gazans.
Mashaal,
who spoke triumphantly in Qatar exhorted that the PA “in its current
state is no authority.” “It expresses a state of impotence, abuse and
(it is a) tool to deepen divisions,” he stressed. He called for the
creation of a new leadership structure that would include all
Palestinians.
Mashaal
intentionally remained ambiguous regarding the nature of the new
structure, perhaps to examine the reactions to his call before moving
forward with any tangible plans.
Expectedly,
the Old Guard who largely remained mute during the Gaza onslaught,
reacted with fury to what they understood as Hamas’ attempt to discount
the PLO, which, for them, represents a place of personal leverage and
status. However, there were some outsiders to the PA’s Old Guard
apparatus who rejected any alternative to the PLO because of what the
organization for long represented, a platform that guided and guarded
Palestinian national aspirations for many years.
But why an alternative to the PLO, and why the fury over a call for a new leadership structure?
The
two main Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah agreed in Cairo in 2005
to revamp the PLO, which would allow Hamas and other organizations that
operate outside its political structures to join. But the agreement was
never activated. Each side accused the other of delaying the much
needed reform. Then, the disagreement appeared factional and political,
as opposed to a substantiated one, predicated on principals.
But
the Israel war on Gaza has created a political reality that cannot be
discounted as factional. Indeed the reverberation of the post Gaza war
can be felt throughout the Middle East, and even beyond, and it will be
some time before the full political and non-political impact of the war
is fully realized. However, as far as inner-Palestinian politics is
concerned, the war on Gaza has yielded two distinctly different groups,
one that is being increasingly referred to as the ‘resistance factions’
(Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other socialist and nationalist groups) and
the Oslo factions (mainly Fatah, but with a few other less known
groupings), dubbed as such because it embraced the Oslo ‘peace process’
culture within Palestinian society. Fatah dominates the PLO, which also
includes factions that stand in solidarity with Hamas in Gaza and
Damascus.
Following
the signing of the Oslo accords in September 2003, the PA, with limited
jurisdiction, if any, was established at the expense of the PLO, which
was once seen as an organization that represented Palestinians
everywhere. The latter’s authority, international import and political
relevance dissipated over time, to the point that it became an
institution that simply represented its members or at best one specific
faction, Fatah. The PLO would resurface once in a while to serve as a
rubber stamp for PA policies, and had long ceased to represent all
Palestinians or play any important role in shaping political realities
in occupied Palestine or anywhere else.
The
PLO’s state of idleness is relatively a new phenomenon. The PLO was
established in 1964, at the behest of Egypt’s Jamal Abdul-Nasser. It
served a complementary role at the time, but grew more independent from
Egypt, although not entirely independent from Arab politics or the
hegemony of specific leaders and parties. Nonetheless, the PLO served
an important role over the years, for it embodied various Palestinian
institutions such as the Palestine National Council (PNC), the
Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), the Palestine National Fund (PNF), and
more.
But
Oslo demanded a new political arrangement that expected a
non-democratic body to represent Palestinians, for obvious reasons.
Thus, the PLO was marginalized, almost entirely. Palestinians in
Diaspora, especially those lingering in refugee camps in Lebanon,
Jordan and elsewhere, felt particularly disowned, for the PA didn’t
represent them and the PLO was no longer a formidable body that
mattered in any truly meaningful way. The PLO however existed, in the
minds of some as a symbol of a unifying body that expressed a nation’s
political aspirations. For others, it was a useful tool summoned to
endorse the PA’s political agenda whenever needed. For example, under
pressure from the US and Arafat, PNC members met to nullify clauses of
the Palestinian constitution that deny Israel’s “right to exist,” and
again, in 1998, under Israeli pressure, and in the presence of former
US President Bill Clinton they were summoned once again to stress
Israel’s right to exist.
The PNC has not held another meeting since.
The
emergence of Hamas as a political power in 2006 was perceived as a
great threat to the Old Guard, for inclusion of Hamas carried the risk
of canceling all the “achievements” scored by the PA since Oslo. Thus
the delay in implementing the Cairo Agreement.
The
war on Gaza, which was meant to crush Hamas, emboldened and empowered
the movement and its supporters, who now insist that any national unity
would have to accommodate post-Gaza realities. In other words,
“resistance” would be affirmed as a “strategic choice.” More, a PLO
that is revamped based on compromises that satisfy both camps could
also mean the end of privilege and domination of the Ramallah-branch
over Palestinian affairs. Thus the pandemonium triggered by Mashaal’s
declaration.
Many
Palestinians are still hoping that the PLO can be revamped without the
need for further fragmentation. However, since neither the current PLO
nor the PA are truly independent bodies, one has to wonder if national
unity under the current circumstances is at all possible.
--Ramzy Baroud (www.ramzybaroud.net)
is an author and editor of PalestineChronicle.com. His work has been
published in many newspapers, journals and anthologies around the
world. His latest book is, "The Second Palestinian Intifada: A
Chronicle of a People's Struggle" (Pluto Press, London).